

## 注記

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## 第1章

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## 第2章

1. 本章は、北朝鮮での生活を描いたりサ・リンによる『ナショナル・ジオグラフィック』のドキュメンタリーを下敷きにしており、北朝鮮人が党幹部や、特に外国人の前でどう振る舞わなければならないかを示している。ドキュメンタリーはユーチューブで視聴可能。“Under Cover in North Korea,” *National Geographic*, 2006, <https://documentaryheaven.com/inside-north-korea/>。
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35. 中国の習近平総書記も、大規模軍事パレードを好んでいる。8月15日の第二次世界大戦終結70周年記念のような非常に重要なパレードに向けた練習では、人民解放軍の各部隊は何本ものロープを使って練習し、一糸乱れぬ動きを追求する。
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