

原 注

本書の執筆にあたって参考とした文献、資料、インタビュー等は、主として筆者がこれまでに発表あるいは出版した研究・調査報告書をもとにしているが、未刊行の米国外交問題評議会の討議資料も一部参考としている。

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〈第9章〉

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〈第12章〉

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